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CDR Henry Phillips 
Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division 
Orlando, Florida 
 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) operations research by Williams (2004) found that platforms 
which employ winged aviators (e.g., Predator) have shown higher mishaps than those that select 
operators that are nonpilots (e.g., Shadow). One explanation may be negative training transfer 
from manned to unmanned platforms as operators are separated from the aircraft, thus depriving 
them of a range of sensory cues (McCarley & Wickens, 2007). Another explanation for higher 
Predator mishaps may be associated with poor Ground Control Station (GCS) design. These 
varying explanations for differences in mishap rates across platforms indicate the need to address a 
number of Human System Integration (HSI) issues including manpower/personnel, training, and 
design issues. Thus, this presentation discusses an effort investigating which UAS Knowledge, 
Skills, and Abilities, (KSAs) support the identification and training of candidates best suited to 
operate UASs. In addition, GCS design considerations directly linked to task workload and KSAs 
are discussed. 
Authors’ Note. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 
position of the organizations with which they are affiliated.   
Human Systems Integration (HSI) is the multi-disciplinary marriage of systems engineering and behavioral science 
(Bost & Miller, 2003). HSI seeks to address issues associated with how the human interacts with other system 
elements (e.g., hardware/software) to ensure effective performance and safety.  Within the DoD HSI consists of a 
number of disciplines including manpower/personnel, training, safety and health, habitability, survivability, and 
Human Factors (Bost & Miller, 2003). Manpower/Personnel addresses all aspects of defining requirements for 
personnel including selecting and retaining those individuals. Training seeks to equip personnel with the necessary 
KSAs for successful mission completion. Safety and health, habitability, and survivability seek to ensure that 
systems are designed to minimize personnel risk of injury and error, ensure that all aspects of the working spaces are 
designed with personnel in mind, and provide personnel with all requisite personal protection needed. Lastly, the 
Human Factors (HF) component of HSI seeks to ensure that all aspects of the system are designed with the full 
consideration of the inherent capabilities and limitations of personnel.  
Research on UAS mishaps has begun to uncover fundamental HSI problems associated with selection, training, and 
design for UAS operations. Specifically, Williams (2004) found that UAS platforms utilizing winged aviators as 
operators (i.e., Predator) have significantly more HF related accidents than those operated by enlisted personnel (i.e., 
Shadow). Investigation of Predator accidents indicates issues concerning instrumentation, sensory feedback systems, 
and channelized attention. Conversely, Shadow HF accidents were found to be related to procedural guidance and 
publications, training issues, overconfidence and crew resource management (Thompson, Tvaryanas, & Constable, 
2005). Although this comparison is of UASs from different groups, with Predators (Group IV) flying higher and 
faster than Shadows (Group III), this difference is unlikely to change the underlying HF issues associated with 
flying beyond visual range. One explanation for these findings may be negative training transfer from manned to 
unmanned platforms as operators are separated from the aircraft, thus depriving them of a range of sensory cues 
(McCarley & Wickens, 2007). This separation of aircraft and pilot puts winged aviators in a situation in which they 
are unable to employ the psychomotor skills that have been trained into automaticity (Grier et al., 2003), suggesting 
that winged aviators may not necessarily have the right competencies (i.e., KSAs) to operate a UAS. Additionally, 
Pagan et al. (2014) and Triplett (2008) found that there are core manned aviator KSAs that go unused when 
operating UASs (e.g., cognitive/spatial, physical/perceptual, and personality based competencies). 
While researchers have begun to address who should operate UASs (e.g., McKinley, McIntire, & Funke, 2009; 
Pagan et al., 2014; Triplett, 2008), selection is only one component to addressing UAS mishaps from the HSI 
perspective.  Another critical aspect is system design as multiple studies have cited confusion with interface and 
 
 
automation modes and difficulty with system management as primary causes for Predator HF related mishaps 
(Nullmeyer, Montijo, Herz, & Leonik, 2007; Thompson et al., 2005; Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008).   
These varying explanations for varying mishap rates across platforms, coupled with the fact that accident rates for 
Global Hawk, Predator, and Reaper are still three times higher than any other category of aircraft within the U.S. Air 
Force (Bloomberg, 2012) suggest further research is warranted. Specifically, research is necessary to identify the 
right individuals with the capabilities to acquire UAS specific skills and ensure they are trained to the appropriate 
KSAs, as well as to derive GCS design guidance that is optimized in a manner that improves overall safety and 
performance. The Optimizing Performance of Trainees for UAS Manpower, Interface and Selection (OPTUMIS) 
effort was developed to address these HSI concerns. OPTUMIS consists of three phases: 1) KSA Comparison 
(manned vs. unmanned), 2) Air Vehicle Operator (AVO) KSA Classification (select, train, design), and 3) 
Performance Differences. This paper describes preliminary results from the second phase of this research effort. 
Specifically, this paper will discusses our attempt to identify those KSAs that should be used for selection and those 
that should be used for training U.S. Navy UAS AVOs, as well as discusses UAS GCS design considerations that 
are directly linked to UAS operator task workload.  
Method 
Measures 
Job Task Analyses (JTAs).  The Analysis of Cross-Platform Naval Unmanned Aircraft System Task and 
Competency Requirements (Mangos, Vincenzi, Shrader, Williams, & Arnold, 2012) was used to identify UAS 
AVOs tasks and requisite KSAs.  This JTA focused on all major UAS systems actively used by the U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps. This JTA identified 256 general and system-specific operator (i.e., crew member, by position) tasks 
and 67 requisite KSAs across platforms.  The Mangos et al., 2012 JTA also provided task difficulty, importance, and 
frequency SME ratings as well as KSA SME importance ratings. Additionally, a qualitative analysis of existing 
UAS JTAs was conducted to ensure a comprehensive list of KSAs was included for further analyses.1 This analysis 
identified another 42 requisite KSAs bringing the total to 109 UAS cross-platform relevant competencies.    
Existing Measures for Selection, Training, and Design Classification. An  analysis of existing methods 
for providing selection, training, and system design guidance that is linked directly to requisite tasks and KSAOs 
was conducted. This analysis involved three steps: 1) identifying overlap among existing methods, 2) identifying 
unique methods, and 3) expanding/developing a model for design guidance. Results from this analysis deemed it 
necessary to expand the Brannick and Levine (2002) model for training and selection guidance to include design 
guidance. This updated model was used to develop techniques and collect required KSA and task information (e.g., 
ranking, categorizing, and elaborating) from UAS SMEs in order to obtain selection, training, and GCS design 
recommendations.   
AVO KSA Classification Survey. The AVO KSA Classification Survey was developed utilizing the 
Brannick and Levine (2002) model for KSA Selection and Training classification. Each KSA was presented with a 
definition and SMEs were asked to provide consensus ratings for each KSA on four scales: 
• Necessary: Is the attribute necessary for newly hired employees to possess upon entering the job? This is a 
dichotomous, yes/no response. 
• Practical: Is the attribute practical to expect of incoming employees in the current labor market? Also a 
dichotomous, yes/no response. 
• Trouble Likely: To what extent is trouble on the job likely if this attribute is ignored in selection (compared with 
the other attributes)? This is a 5-point scale ranging from “very little or none” (1) to “an extremely great extent” 
(5). 
• Superior from Average. To what extent do different levels of the KSA distinguish the superior from the average 
operator (compared to the other KSAs)? The Superior from Average scale was rated on the same 5-point scale 
as the Trouble Likely scale.  
1Due to space limitations a complete listing of UAS JTAs utilized for this effort was not provided. For a complete 
listing of utilized UAS JTAs please contact the study authors.  
 
 
                                                          
 Participants 
Seven U.S. Navy UAS operators were asked to provide consensus ratings for the AVO KSA Classification Survey. 
Operators’ backgrounds consisted of AVOs (2), Mission Commanders (3), and a Sensor Operator (1). Their 
experience ranged from 10 months to 3.5 years in Groups III -V (e.g. Shadow, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance Demonstrator [BAMS-D]).  
Results  
A multi-pronged approached was used to classify KSAs into selection, training, or design categories. First, data 
from the KSA Classification Survey was used to classify selection and training categories.   
Selection.  KSAs were classified as required for selection based on the Brannick and Levine (2002) 
criteria: KSAs rated as “Necessary”, “Practical”, and 1.5 or higher on the “Trouble Likely” scale. Subsequently, 
selection KSAs were ranked based on a weighted score derived from multiplying scores on the “Trouble Likely” 
scale by scores on the “Superior from Average” scale (Brannick & Levine, 2002). Next, the “select to” KSAs were 
cross referenced with the KSA importance ratings from the Mangos et al., 2012 JTA to ensure all selection KSAs 
were rated as greater than moderately important on the five point importance scale used (i.e., 3.5 or greater). Finally, 
KSAs that were considered to be minimum qualifications for job performance we removed (e.g., general health, 
dynamic flexibility). The resulting KSAs are presented in Table 1. The KSAs presented in Table 1 are broken into 
four tiers. KSAs within a tier are grouped by importance ranking for selection (i.e., Tier 1 KSAs are most valuable 
for selection of UAS operators and Tier 4 are least valuable).  
Table 1.  
UAS Operator "Select To" KSAs 
 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 
Dependable 
 
Self-Discipline 
 
Accountability 
 
Mathematical 
Ability  
 
Control 
Precision 
 
Manual 
Dexterity 
 
Hand-Eye 
Coordination 
 
Reaction Time 
 
Information 
Management 
Skills  
Auditory 
Attention 
/Localization 
 
Finger Dexterity 
 
Wrist-Finger 
Speed 
 
Multi-limb 
Coordination 
 
Vigilance 
 
Resilience 
 
Moral Interest 
 
Attention to 
Detail 
 
Rule Abiding 
 
Learning Ability 
 
Numerical 
Reasoning 
 
Work Motivation 
 
Perseverance 
 
Straightforward-ness 
 
Cohesiveness 
 
Extraversion 
 
 
Interpersonal 
Skills 
 
Cooperation 
 
Listening Skills 
 
 
Oral Expression 
 
Oral 
Comprehension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Training.  Next, KSAs required for training were classified and ranked using the Brannick and Levine, 
2002 methodology: KSAs were classified for training if they were rated as not “Necessary” and given a greater than 
1.5 rating on the “Superior from Average” scale; training KSAs were then ranked based on their “Superior from 
Average” score. Then these KSAs were cross-referenced with the Mangos et al., 2012 KSA importance ratings. The 
resulting “train to” KSAs are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2.  
UAS Operator “Train To” KSAs 
Tier 1 
 
Tier 2 Tier 3 
Deliberation 
 
Adaptability 
 
Stress Tolerance 
 
Handling Crisis 
 
Disengagement 
 
Working Memory 
 
Initiative 
 
Concentration/ 
Selection Attention 
 
Attention Allocation 
 
Task Prioritization 
 
Navigation Skills 
 
Spatial Orientation 
 
Spatial Visualization 
 
Mental Rotation 
 
Communication 
Procedures 
Planning  
 
Safety Consciousness 
 
Systems 
Comprehension 
 
Technical 
Troubleshooting 
 
Decision Making  
 
Energy 
 
Leadership  
 
Assertiveness 
 
Map Reading 
 
Unit/Command 
Objectives 
 
Aviation Principles 
 
Basic Operation 
Procedure 
 
UAS Operations2 
 
Arm-handedness 
Threat Categories 
and Indicators 
 
Reconnaissance 
Procedures 
 
Engagement  
Procedures 
 
Meteorology 
 
Aeronautical 
Terminology  
 
Flight Rules and 
Regulations 
 
Information 
Orderings 
 
Rate Control 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Originality 
 
Resolving Conflicts 
 
Mechanical 
Comprehension 
 
Perceptual Speed and 
Accuracy 
 
Response Selection 
 
Organization Skills 
 
Time Management 
Skills 
 
Critical Thinking 
Skills 
 
Reasoning Skills 
 
Problem Solving Skills 
 
Teamwork Skills 
 
Category Flexibility 
 
Helpfulness 
Confidence   
 
Long-Term Memory  
 
Depth Perception   
 
Stamina 
2UAS Operations includes navigation, sensors, and weapons knowledge.  
 
Design Guidance.  The Brannick and Levine (2002) method was also used to identify KSAs relevant to 
performance that SMEs determined should be addressed through system design rather than through training or 
selection. This list included any KSA that was rated  highly on the “Superior from Average” scale (rating of 3 or 
greater) but not considered “Necessary” or “Practical”, and that was rated low on the “Trouble Likely” scale (i.e., 
not a candidate for training). The only KSAs that met these criteria and were placed in the “design to” category 
among the 109 KSAs were Flexibility of Closure (i.e., identifying/detecting known patterns [e.g., figure, word, 
object] that are hidden in other material) and Pattern Recognition (i.e., detecting a known pattern [e.g., a numerical 
code]; combining and organizing different pieces of information into a meaningful pattern quickly). 
The project team is currently adapting the Brannick and Levine (2002) method to include workload ratings tied 
directly to individual tasks. Workload ratings provided for those UAS Cross Platform JTA tasks during which the 
AVO has direct interaction with the system (amounting to 188 of the original 256) are currently being evaluated to 
identify the optimal candidate tasks for incorporation into automation evaluations. These data are currently being 
collected and will further inform system design guidance. 
  
 
 
Implications 
Our analysis found a number of general competencies that should be considered when developing selection and 
training protocols for UAS AVOs in order to avoid costly mishaps. These competencies are ranked by importance to 
provide cost-benefit guidance to selection and training decision makers. For example, if funding constraints prevent 
decision makers from implementing a selection test battery that measures all of the KSAs identified in Table 1 then 
they can at minimum ensure that a sampling of the Tier 1 competencies are utilized. Additionally, our guidance can 
be used as a gap analysis tool for current UAS selection and training protocols. Decision makers can use this 
guidance to ensure that their current selection and training protocols include those KSAs identified in our analysis. 
These protocols can then be updated accordingly depending on the individual programs requirements and funding.  
The methodology used for the initial “design to” competency analysis identified two KSAs (i.e., Flexibility of 
Closure and Pattern Recognition) that SMEs reported cannot reliably be addressed through selection or training. 
While all other KSAs should be considered during the design process, Flexibility of Closure and Pattern 
Recognition should be considered critical from a GCS design perspective as they adhere to the principles of HSI. For 
example, the literature has shown that systems can be designed to allow operators to more easily recognize patterns 
to improve the quality of their decision making and performance (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007). 
Additionally, we are in the process of expanding our analysis to the task level to provide a more robust set of design 
guidelines linked to both tasks and KSAs.               
Limitations 
As previously mentioned our effort sought to provide platform agnostic guidance. However, one must not blindly 
follow the guidance provided. Selection, training, and system developers must be sure that when developing these 
protocols and technologies the individual competencies indeed meet their platform requirements. For example, 
Wrist-Finger Speed and Arm Handedness were identified as Tier 1 competencies; however, these may only be 
relevant to UAS platforms that use joystick interfaces. 
Moreover, the sample used to develop this guidance was service specific, consisting of seven Navy operators with 
Group 3-5 experience and may not be generalizable to other services or smaller platforms.  Further, it is important to 
note that these findings are preliminary, as the small sample size warrants the need for additional data points.  
Additionally, these rating Finally, further research is necessary to better understand the empirical implications from 
this guidance. Empirical investigation will provide insight as to whether selecting, training, and designing to these 
specific competencies will in fact improve operator performance and in turn reduce UAS mishaps.   
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